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Abstract-A new dynamic access control scheme for information protection systems is proposed 
in this paper. The main idea of it is inspired by the concept of the trapdoor knapsack problem 
proposed by Merkle and Hellman. Since the knapsack problem is an NP-complete problem, the 
security of access control is achieved henceforth. Our scheme associates esch user with some user 
keys and each file with some file keys. There is a positive integer set of S’; through a simple formula 
on keys and S’, the corresponding access privilege can be easily revealed in the protection system. 
Moreover, by employing our scheme, insertion or deletion of the user/file can be processed effectively 
with only a few previously defined keys and locks required to be modified. 
Keywords-Access control, Cryptosystem, Information protection system, Knapsack problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of information security has been studied to reduce the rising abuse of computers and 
the increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks in the last two or three decades. 
The main concern in this paper is access control, which is one of the most important safeguards 
in file protection systems. The basic access privileges are classified as to own, to read, to write, 
to execute, to delete, etc. These access privileges are rather useful to prevent the accidental or 
malicious disclosure, modification, or destruction of records, data sets, and program segments. In 
order to achieve the access control, an access control matrix specifying who has access privileges 
to which system resources may be employed. An access control matrix establishes the relationship 
of each user subject and every resource object. Conventionally, the accessible objects are lined 
in rows and various subjects are lined in columns. 
In this paper, it is assumed that all the access privileges are expressed by numerals. Logically, 
each user can be identified as a positive integer i and each resource as a positive integer j, and we 
assign zero to every matrix element which holds no access privilege. Thus, every entry aij in the 
access control matrix A stands for the corresponding access privilege of accessor i to resource j. 
EXAMPLE 1.1. Let us consider a system with five users (subjects) and four files (objects). Its 
access control matrix is shown in Figure 1. By this access control matrix, access privileges of all 
subjects to access the corresponding objects are given. For instance, the privilege of Sr to access 
02 is 3, which means the information access privilege is “to write.” All given access privileges 
exist in a linear hierarchy. In other words, the access is allowed only if the access request is 
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smaller than or equal to the corresponding numeral in the matrix. 
to write implies the privilege to write, to read and to execute, the 
privileges. 
It means that the privilege 
privilege to own implies all 
Subject Object 
01 02 03 04 
Sl 1 3 0 2 
s2 2 1 3 2 
s3 0 0 2 4 
s4 1 2 3 0 
s5 4 0 2 0 
0: No access; 1: Execute; 2: Read; 3: Write; 4: Own. 
Figure 1. An access control matrix. 
Since the access control matrix, in general, is very sparse, it therefore is never cost effective 
to implement such a matrix (11. For solving this problem, many methods have been proposed 
including the capability-list method, the accessor-list method, and the key-lock matching method 
by Graham and Denning [2], Wu and Hwang’s key-lock-pair (KLP) method based upon Galois 
field algebra [3], Chang’s method based upon generalized Chinese remainder theorem [4], Chang 
and Jiang’s method using the binary operations [5], Laih, Harn and Lee’s method based upon 
Newton’s interpolating polynomial [6], and Jan’s single key access scheme [7]. Here, we only 
mention some of their obvious disadvantages. The capability-list method and the accessor-list 
method have to do an exhaustive search whenever an “update” request is made. The key-lock 
matching system has a capability list for each user subject and a lock list for each resource object. 
Consequently, it is very time consuming to update any information within the protection system, 
since searching a list unavoidably requires an exhaustive search. Wu and Hwang’s KLP method 
has to reconstruct all keys and locks values whenever a new user is joined to the file protection 
system. Those methods including Chang [4], Chang et al. [5], Laih et al. [6], and Jan [7], can’t 
dynamically process the access control in the file system, while Jan et al. [8] recently presented 
a dynamic KLP method. 
In the next section, we shall review the knapsack problem and Merkle et aZ.‘s knapsack cryp- 
tosystem. Our dynamic access control scheme is described in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are 
given in Section 4. 
2. REVIEW OF THE KNAPSACK PROBLEM AND 
MERKLE et al’s CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The set of NP-complete problems is very large and keeps growing all the time. They include 
many famous problems, such as the knapsack problem, Hamiltonian circuits, the traveling sales- 
person problem and the satisfiable problem, etc. Up till now, none of the NP-complete problems 
can be solved by any polynomial algorithm in the worst case. In other words, the best algorithm 
to solve any NP-complete problem has the exponential time-complexity in the worst case. 
Since the knapsack problem is one of the NP-complete problems, it will be impossible to solve 
in polynomial time. The security of access control is accordingly achieved. Now, let us take a 
look at the definition of the O/l knapsack problem as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.1. [O/l KNAPSACK PROBLEM]. Given a positive integer C and a sequence of 
integers S = ~1, ~2,. . . , s,, is there a sequence of integers xi’s such that ~~=, xisi = C, where 
xi = 0 or 1 for 1 5 i 5 n? 
By the definition of the O/l knapsack problem, it means that it evaluates a binary vector 
X=(zi,z~,...,z~)suchthat 
c = x . (S)? (2.1) 
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For instance, given an integer C = 14 and a vector of S = (1, 10,5,22,3), we can find a binary 
vector X = (1, 1, 0, 0,l) satisfies the formula of (2.1) such that 
1 
(1 1 0 0 1) :” 
II 
= 14. 
22 
3 
In Merkle and Hellman’s cryptosystem [9], the sender hides his private information messages X 
successfully by the inner product of an opened vector S (which belongs to the receiver) and 
messages X. However, the private information messages X can be decoded easily by the receiver, 
but it is very difficult for the actual messages X to be obtained by eavesdroppers. 
Described below is a mechanism for keeping information secret based upon the knapsack prob- 
lem proposed by Merkle and Hellman. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(3) 
(9) 
Given a positive integer vector S’ = (si, sa, . . . , si), where si are super increasing, i.e., 
s~>C~~:s~ fori=1,2 ,..., n. 
Given a positive integer u, such that u > ~~I1 s:. 
Given a positive integer e as a cipher key. 
Compute a decipher key d, such that e . d = 1 mod u and gcd(d, u) = 1. 
Compute S = e. S’ mod u = (es; mod u, es; mod u, . . . , es:, mod u) = (si, 52,. . . , s,). 
/* the set of S is a O/l knapsack set */. 
The pair (d, u) be reserved as a secret key. 
Encipherment: There exists a cipher integer C value such that 
c = x. (S)T 
Sl 
32 
= (51 z2 . . . xc,)* . . 
i:i %I 
Decipherment: Compute C’ such that 
C’=d.Cmodu 
=d.(X.ST)modu 
= d. X. (e . S’)T mod u 
= x * (S’)? 
(2.2) 
Since those entries of vector S’ are super increasing, according to the proposition 
ofs: > Cil:s> fori = 1,2,... , n, the binary vector X = (x1,22,. . . ,x,) can be solved by 
Procedure 1 as follows. 
Procedure 1 
BEGIN 
FORi:=n DOWNTO 1 
BEGIN 
IF C’ < s: THEN 
xj :=o 
ELSE 
xi := 1 
C’ := C’ - xi . s; 
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END 
IF C’ # 0 THEN 
error 
END 
As indicated above, we see that the designer can transform the easily solved knapsack vector S’ 
into a trapdoor knapsack S by the relation 
S = (e . S’) mod u. (2.3) 
In (2.3), those entries of S are evaluated pseudo-randomly, therefore, it is apparent that any 
one who knows S, but not d and u, would have great difficulties in solving a knapsack problem 
involving S. Whenever an attack has been proposed [lo], a polynomial time is necessary to break 
such a knapsack cryptosystem. 
In the next section, we shall employ the mechanism of the cryptosystem of Merkle and Hellman 
to our dynamic access control scheme. Furthermore, in order to prevent anyone else from finding 
the solution easily, we shall convert the original access control matrix to a pseudorandomly 
variant access control matrix in such a way that the security of our scheme compares to any one 
of [3-81 and is apparently advantageous. 
3. A DYNAMIC ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME 
BASED UPON THE KNAPSACK PROBLEM 
Conventionally, the file system holds to p different users numbered from 1 to p, and q different 
files from 1 to q. Whenever a user i is joined into the system, its corresponding q privileges for 
files should be determined (similarly for a file joining). In order to achieve the access control, the 
file system is required to create some key values according to these access privileges which are 
stored in tables, i.e., user file key table and file key table for later retrieval. 
In the following, we present a mechanism that fulfills the requirement of an information pre 
tection system such as Figure 2. Now, let us consider a simple access control matrix A with five 
users and ten files as depicted in Figure 3. The sequence of appearance of users and files are, for 
instance,asfollows: U~,F~,F2,Uz,F3,Fq,U3,F;,Fs,F7,U4,F8,U5,Fs,Fl~. 
In order to prevent the access control scheme from being broken easily by an attack. We shall 
convert the original access control matrix A,,, into a pseudo-randomly variant matrix BmXn 
depicted as follows: 
Algorithm A 
Input: An original access privilege aij. 
output: A pseudo-randomly variant bit-string access privilege bij. 
Step 1: Given an integer p such that p > aij for 1 5 i 5 m and 1 5 j 5 n, 
where m is the number of users and n is the number of files. 
Step 2: Compute aij = (aij + (i + j)) mod p. 
Step 3: Convert aij into bit-string bij, where the length of bit-string bij is 3= [log, 51. 
/* 5 is a minimum number greater than all of the privilege values */ 
Step 4: Compute t = (i + j) mod 3. 
Step 5: Evaluate bit-string bij by left-rotating t times for bit-string bij. 
Using Algorithm A (in which let p = 8 = 2f’Osz “I), the access control matrix Asx 10 in Figure 3 
will be converted into a variant bit-string matrix Bsx ic as shown in Figure 4. Moreover, in order 
to achieve the access privilege aij, two important tables and two lists are generated in Table 1. 
Whenever Vi requests to access Fj, first, the file system searches those two “deleted” lists, and 
the requirement fails whenever the Vi node is in the user “deleted” list (or the Fj node is in 
the file “deleted” list). Second, the file system searches the user key table if NFi >_ j, and a 
subject 
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system object 
a user’s request access privilege value 
users 
> 
Files 
> 
Figure 2. The organization of the dynamic KLP protection system. 
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0: No access; 1: Execute; 2: Read; 3: Write; 4: Own. 
Figure 3. An access control matrix A. 
1 A 1 110 110 111 000 011 110 101 Ii 1001 
I 
15 1 001 010 001 ool loo 110 101 111 
I 
9 
100 
111 .! 1 01 
10 
01 
100 u 011 001 
Figure 4. A variant bit-string access control matrix B 
key value Ki, and a number of corresponding files NFi in the user key table are fetched, where 
T = [fl. Otherwise, the file system searches a key value K&_ and a number of corresponding 
users NUj from the file key table, where T = r$l. 
Before describing how to generate user keys and file keys in Table 1 by employing Algorithm B, 
let us temporarily define the set S’ and compute S = e . S’ mod u in (2.3) as follows: 
(1) Given a set of S’ = {1,2,5,11,23,47,95,191,383,767,1535,3071}. (3.1) 
(2) Given u = 6143 > C” 5:. (3.2) 
(3) Given e = 3. (3.3) 
(4) Compute d = 2048 by Extended Euclid’s algorithm [ll]. (3.4) 
(5) Compute 
S = (e . S’) mod u 
= (3,6,15,33,69,141,285,573,1149,2301,4605,3070). (3.5) 
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Table 1. Key tables and “deleted” lists. 
User key table File key table 
Ul NULL 
U2 210 
U3 1272 
U4 2118 1557 
US 4303 11515 
key value 
User ‘deleted’ list: 
File ‘deleted’ list: 
NF 
0 
2 
4 
7 
8 
- 
INULLI 
[NULL1 
Fl 
F2 
F3 
F4 
FS 
Fa 
El 
Fs 
F9 
Flo 
key value 
18 
21 
117 
126 
9 
1323 
1644 
2925 
5902 0 
7714 15 
NV 
i- 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
- 
NF: the number of corresponding files 
Nu: the number of corresponding users 
Algorithm B 
This algorithm generates a user key table. 
/* Initially, one user and two “NULL” lists reside in the file system, here these two lists indicate 
which users (or files) have been deleted. */ 
Input: 
output: 
Step 1: 
Step .2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
Step 6: 
User vectors (ail, ui2,. . . , UQVF,)‘s. 
A user key table. 
Repeat through Step 6 while access control matrix remains to be processed. 
[Convert user vectors into variant bit-string vectors 1. 
Convert user vectors (ail, ais,. . . , UQVF,)‘S into variant, bit-string vectors 
(bil, bi2, . . . , bi,rvF; )‘s by Algorithm A, where bij is corresponding to aij 
for 1 5 j 5 NFi. 
[Determine the number of corresponding file NFi 1. 
Compute NFi =I 1 Bi 1 I, where 1 I Bi I I denotes the length of vector Bi. 
[Convert bit-string vector Bi into binary vector Xi] 
t = NFi. 
WHILE t mod 4 # 0 DO 
Append bit-string “000” into Bi vector. 
t =t+1. 
END {WHILE} 
Convert bit-string vector Bi = (bil, bi2, . . . , bit) into binary vector 
Xi = (%,5i2, %3,5i4, xi5, zi6,. . . ,xi,3t-2,xi,3t-l,xi,3t). 
/* 1) Bi II= t and II Xi I(= 3t */ 
[Divide vector Xi into subvector X,] 
v = t div 4. 
c = 0. 
FOR r=l to v DO 
xi, = (Xi,c+1, xi,c+2, f.. , %,12r). 
c = 12 * T. 
END {FOR} 
[Compute keys Ki,‘s] 
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FOR r=l to ‘u DO 
Ki, = Xi,. (L?)~. 
/* S is given in (3.5) and (S)T denotes the transpose of S */ 
Step 7: [Output values Ki’s and NFJ. 
Output Ki’s and NFi values onto the ith entry of the user key table. 
The file key table can also be generated by employing Algorithm B similarly. 
EXAMPLE 3.1. Let us consider the access control matrix shown in Figure 3. Two important 
tables are generated by employing Algorithm B and two “deleted” lists depicted in Table 1. In 
order to demonstrate the correctness of access control in the application of the knapsack problem, 
let us reveal U46 and uzg, for instance, as follows. 
Consider U46; first, we search the user and file “deleted” lists. Since the two lists are NULL, 
the user key table in Table 1 will be searched further. We find the number of files associated 
with U4 in the user key table is 7, which implies that files l-7 can be accessed by user U4. Since 
file Fs is within this range, we can use Algorithm C to evaluate U46. 
(1) The corresponding value of K42=1557 can be derived. 
(2) Decode K42=1557 into C’ = 1557 * 2048 mod 6143 = 519, and X = (segment,, 
segments, segments, segment,)=(Oll, 110,101,000) is obtained by Procedure 1. 
(3) segment,=“llO” is extracted from X, further, &s= “011” is evaluated for segment, by 
right-rotate once. 
(4) Convert a&,= “011” into integer 3. 
(5) Compute 
U46 = c& - (4+ 6) mod 8 
= -7mod8 
which is correct. 
As to ass, we see that user Us and file Fg have not been deleted from those two lists in Table 1. 
Further, we find the number of files NF2 is 2, which is less than 9. Therefore, key value K& in 
the file key table will be searched. Similarly, we use Algorithm C to evaluate ass. 
(1) The corresponding value of K&=5902 can be derived. 
(2) Decode K&=5902 into C’ = 5902 * 2048 mod 6143 = 4015, and X = (segment,, 
segments, segments, segment4)=(100, 111,100,101) is obtained by Procedure 1. 
(3) segment,= “111” is extracted from X, further, ai,= “111” is evaluated for segment2 by 
right-rotate 2 times. 
(4) Convert uhg= “111” into integer 7. 
(5) Compute 
us9 = uag - (2 + 9) mod 8 
= -4mod8 
which is correct. 
= 4, 
Algorithm C 
This algorithm finds the key value Ki, from user key table and decodes the Ki, into an access 
privilege Uij. 
Input: A user Vi and a file Fj. 
output: An access privilege aij. 
Step 1: [Extract Ki, from the user key table] 
r = [f]. 
Output Ki, from the user key table. 
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Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
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[Decode key value Ki, into binary vector X = (zi, ~2,. . . , zl2)] 
C’= Ki,.dmodu. 
/* u, d are given in (3.2) and (3.4). */ 
EvaluateX=(zi,zs,..., 212) by employing Procedure 1 in Section 2. 
/* in Procedure 1, let n = 12 and S’ is given in (3.1). */ 
[Divide X into four segments and determine each segment as one 
pseudo-access privilege] 
FORZ=O to 3D0 
segmentl+l = (x31+1, x31+2, x31+3). 
END 
Let s = j mod 4, and if s = 0 then let s = 4. 
Extract segment, as a pseudo access privilege. 
[Convert a pseudo-access privilege into an actual access privilege] 
aij = segment, 
Compute t = (i + j) mod 3. 
Evaluate a; for segment, by right-rotating t times. 
Represent bit-string a$ with an integer. 
aij = (a; - (i + j)) mod p, here let p = 8 = 2f10s2 51. 
[Output an integer access privilege a~] 
Output an access privilege aij. 
The key value K&. can also be decoded by employing Algorithm C (which replaces variable j 
with variable i) similarly. 
However, in order to dynamically demonstrate the access privilege in a file system, we shall 
demonstrate the details with three relative cases as follows: 
CASE I. A file Fj (or a user Vi) is deleted from the file system. 
In this case, we only append the file Fj (or user Vi) into the file (or user) “deleted” list which 
denotes that files (users) have been deleted from the file system. 
EXAMPLE 3.2. Let us consider the access control system as shown in Table 1. Assume that we 
delete two files Fe and Fs. According to our strategy, these files will be appended into the file 
“deleted” list which denotes these two files have been deleted from the file system. After files Fs 
and Fs are deleted, a modified access control matrix A is shown in Figure 5, and two key tables 
and two “deleted” lists associated with Figure 5 are shown in Table 2. 
CASE II . A new file Fj or a new user Vi is joined into the file system. 
Whenever a new file Fj is joined into the file system, first, we must judge whether or not 
the file “deleted” list is NULL, then compute its corresponding key values. In the following, we 
I‘*” denotes the file has been deleted from the file system. 
Figure 5. A deleted xcess control matrix A. 
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Table 2. Key tables and “deleted” lists. 
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User key table 
Fl 
F2 
F3 
F4 
FS 
* F6 
Fl 
* Fs 
F9 
FIO 
File key table 
key value 
18 
21 
117 
126 
9 
1323 
1644 
2925 
5902 0 
7714 15 
ii 
i- 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
- 
User ‘deleted’ list: El 
File ‘deleted’ list: 
“*” denotes the file has been deleted from the file system 
describe this case in two parts. Part one: if the list is not NULL, then we extract a node Fq 
which occupies the first node in the file “deleted” list, and delete the first node Fq. Furthermore, 
we recompute some new file key values Kqr ’ ‘s by employing Algorithm B (in which the input file 
vector is (aiq, a~, . . . , a~u,,~), where NU, is a number of corresponding user values in the old 
file key table). And we recompute some new key values K+‘s for each Vi by Algorithm D for 
NU, + 1 5 i 5 m, where m is the total number of user values, (i.e., we replace Fj with Fq into 
the file system). Part two: if the file “deleted” list is NULL, then we directly compute all key 
values K&. by employing Algorithm B. 
EXAMPLE 3.3. Let us consider an access control matrix in Figure 5. We want to join a file FG, 
where the file vector is (3,0,2,0,2) into the file system. Since the file “deleted” list is not NULL 
in Table 2 and Fs and Fs have been deleted, we thus extract the first node Fe out of the file 
“deleted” list. In other words, the new vector of file Fc (3,0,2,0,2) is joined into the file system. 
Further, we compute its corresponding new key values K &‘s, Ki,‘s by employing Algorithm B 
and Algorithm D. 
According to CASE II mentioned above, first, since the old number of corresponding user 
values NUs = 3, we shall compute new keys K &. by Algorithm B (in which the input file vector 
is (3,0,2)). Therefore, a new key value K& = 3450 is computed. We replace an old key K& with 
the new key value K& onto the file key table. Second, since the old number NUG is 3, NUs+l = 4, 
thus the new key values Ki, for 4 5 i 5 5 are recomputed by employing Algorithm D as follows. 
As to a new key value K42, since the new access privilege of l_Jd to Fs is 0, by employing 
Algorithm D, we convert the access privilege 0 into pseudo-access privilege “100”. Furthermore, 
a new key value K42 = 1488 can be computed. Similarly, the new access privilege of Us to FG 
is 2. Therefore, a new key value K.Q = 11446 is obtained. 
A new access control matrix is shown in Figure 6 and two important key tables and two 
“deleted” lists are given in Table 3 to illustrate the result of joining FG into the file system. 
Algorithm D 
This algorithm finds some old user key values and generates some new user key values which 
are directly modified from the old user key values (the file key value can be generated similarly). 
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Input: A joined file Fq. 
output: Some new user key value Ki,. 
Step 1: [Input the total number of users] 
T= the total number of users. 
Step 2: [I p t n u an old number of corresponding user values NU,] 
NU,=the number of Fq corresponding users values in the old file key table. 
Step 3: [Upd t a e some new user key values Kzt,‘s] 
i = NU, + 1. 
WHILE i 5 T DO /* update all K values of user i */ 
Convert an access privilege UQ into bit-string bi, by Algorithm A. 
T = [f]. 
Decode an old key value Ki, into binary vector X by the Step 2 
of Algorithm C. 
Divide X into four segments and determine each segment 
as an old access privilege by the Step 3 of Algorithm C. 
Replace segment, with bi, in binary vector X. 
/* segment, is global variable */ 
Compute a new key value K,‘, = X . ( S)T. 
/* S is given in (3.5) and (S)T denotes the transpose of S */ 
i=i+1. 
END. { WHILE } 
Step 4: [Output all updated values KZrp’s] 
Output all updated key values K,t,, . . . , KG,. 
9 10 
0 1 
4 0 5 0 3 1 0 2 2 
I I 
I‘+” denotes the file is just joined into the file system. 
“*” denotes the file has been deleted from the file system. 
Figure 6. A joined access control matrix A. 
CASE III. An old privilege cij of user Vi to the file Fj is updated. 
Whenever a user Vi and a file Fj exist, we can modify its privilege value oij with a new value. 
EXAMPLE 3.4. Consider an access control matrix shown in Figure 6. If we want to update its 
access privilege aas with new value 3, marked by a ‘+’ shown in Figure 7, we first search the user 
key table, and find the corresponding NF, value is 8, less than the j value 9. Thus we search 
the file key table and recompute the new key value Kh2 = 3 by employing Algorithm D. Table 4 
shows what the result looks like. 
Access Control Scheme 85 
Table 3. Key tables and “deleted” lists. 
Ul 
u2 
u3 
u4 
US 
User key table File key table 
* Fa 2925 
Fg 5902 0 
Flo 7714 15 
User ‘deleted’ list: IEEl 
File ‘deleted’ list: 
I 
“*” denotes tbe file has been deleted from the file system 
“+” denotes the key value is recomputed 
I 8 
4 tl 0 1 0 
I5 13 2 2 0 0 2 1 21 
10 
1 
0 1 3 0 2 
iiT 
i- 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
- 
‘I*” denotes the file has been deleted from the file system. 
“+I’ denotes the access privilege is updated. 
Figure 7. An updated access control matrix A. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a new method for constructing a dynamic access control in a file system. 
The main idea in our scheme is inspired by Merkle et al. [9] in which security rests in part on 
the knapsack problem that is the well-known NP-complete problem. 
Although the security of the cryptosystem of Merkle et aE. has been broken in a polynomial 
time by Shamir [lo], it still permits its security to be achieved by variant transformations. More 
formally, if private messages were more randomly distributed before encoding, the security of 
messages would be increased accordingly. In order to achieve the security of access control in 
application of the knapsack problem, we convert an original access control matrix into a pseudo- 
randomly variant access control matrix so as to strongly prevent anyone else from breaking down 
the file system easily. And, one point worthy to note is that the S’ set in (3.1) can be extended 
until the encoding security is guaranteed. 
Moreover, by employing our encoding technique, a dynamic access control scheme in which 
delete, insert and update operations are provided in the file protection system could be performed 
easily. 
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Table 4. Key tables and “ deleted” lists. 
User key table File key table 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Ul NULL 0 
u2 210 2 
U3 1272 4 
u4 2118 1488 7 
US 4303 11446 8 
key value P key value 
Fl 
F2 
F3 
F4 
F5 
F6 
F7 
* Fs 
F9 
FIO 
18 
21 
117 
126 
9 
3450 
1644 
2925 
5902 
0 
+3 
7714 15 
User ‘deleted’ list: IEEl 
File ‘deleted’ list: 
I 
“*” denotes the file has been deleted from the file system 
“+” denotes the key value is recomputed 
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